

Insights and Best Practices
Focus Paper

**Integration of Lethal
and Nonlethal Actions**

Second Edition

Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7

July 2013

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

This is the Second Edition of the Integration and Lethal and Nonlethal Actions Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 and published by the Joint Staff J7.

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PREFACE

The Joint Staff J7 supports the CJCS and the Joint Warfighter through joint force development to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. This paper, written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD), helps inform both the joint warfighters and key functions within the J7, notably lessons learned, doctrine, education, and future joint force development. In addition to this paper, the DTD has also developed an overarching Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices Paper and numerous other focus papers that share insights and best practices for various challenges observed at joint headquarters. All of these papers are unclassified for broad accessibility. I commend these papers for your reading.

The DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant and joint task force commanders and their staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations. The DTD observer/trainers collect and compare practices among the different headquarters, draw out and refine “insights” and “best practices,” and share them with the joint force.

We are fortunate to have several senior flag officers, active and retired, assist in development and vetting of these insights and best practice papers. Of note, General (Retired) Gary Luck, a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University, plays an active part. Their participation not only helps keep the DTD trainers at the theater-strategic and operational level, but also ensures that they retain a commander-centric perspective in these papers.

Please pass on your comments to DTD’s POC Mr. Mike Findlay so that we can improve this paper. Email address is: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil.



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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

Experience over the last 10 years of operations has underscored the need to integrate nonlethal and lethal actions. Military nonlethal actions need to be integrated with both lethal actions and nonmilitary (DImE) actions early on during design and planning and also as part of the targeting and execution activities to achieve desired outcomes (see below figure). We continue to see the importance of unified action and working with our mission partners to support our national and international interests. Therefore, it is important to actively seek out and include our mission partners and stakeholders in our assessment, design, planning, targeting, and execution while also supporting their planning and execution.


We find that commanders and planners need to integrate lethal and nonlethal actions up front in the design and planning process rather than “adding on” nonlethal actions at the end.¹ Design activities, planning guidance, and commander’s intent provide the necessary up front direction for the synchronization of staff planning efforts for both lethal and nonlethal activities. These also provide the necessary direction for refinement of specific actions such as key leader engagement, cyber, military deception, and MISO developed through a targeting-like methodology in the more near-term time frame.

We have seen the requirement for synchronization of selected actions to ensure actions match words to avoid what some call “effects” fratricide. This requires significant crosstalk between lethal and nonlethal planning and targeting forums and disciplined use of B2C2WGs to synchronize staff efforts. However, we observe that strategic and operational level headquarters should not attempt to synchronize every action. This is because synchronization of tactical level actions by higher headquarters may very likely impinge on and possibly paralyze subordinate agility. Additionally, such higher level synchronization efforts cannot keep up with the totality and dynamic nature of actions occurring in the battlespace.

We see commanders tailoring the HQ organizational structure and processes according to the anticipated scope and integration of lethal and nonlethal actions expected in the operation. Steering Groups and/or Synchronization Boards can be used where necessary to facilitate integration prior to decision boards. It is also necessary to clearly define the scope of staff responsibilities for planning and integration of lethal and nonlethal actions to ensure unity of effort and coherency of planning. This includes clarifying J3 and J5 responsibilities for staff synchronization.

Insights:

- Integrate lethal and nonlethal actions up front in the design and planning process rather than “adding on” nonlethal actions at the end.



¹ See also the DTD Design and Planning focus paper (July 2013). URL located on inside cover of front page.

- Actively seek out and include mission partners in your assessment, planning, targeting, and execution while also supporting their planning and execution.
- Ensure crosstalk within the staff and with other agencies to improve synchronization.
- Synchronize designated actions as appropriate at the strategic and operational level to avoid “effects” fratricide. Delegate detailed tactical-level synchronization as appropriate to subordinate units and other mission partners.
- Use a “targeting-like” methodology to develop and coordinate specific nonlethal actions (e.g., KLE) much like developing and coordinating lethal fires.
- Clearly define scope of staff responsibilities for planning and integration of lethal and nonlethal actions to ensure coherency of planning. Clarify J3 and J5 responsibilities for staff synchronization.
- Tailor the HQ organizational structure and processes according to the anticipated scope and integration of lethal and nonlethal actions expected in the operation. For example, use Steering Groups and/or Synchronization Boards where necessary to ensure integration leading up to a decision board.

2.0 OVERVIEW – LETHAL AND NONLETHAL ACTIONS.

Description and Need for Integration. Lethal and nonlethal actions can complement each other and create dilemmas for opponents. Thus planning of lethal and nonlethal actions is inseparable.²


The last 10 years of operations has heightened attention on many of the nonlethal actions necessary on the irregular battlefield. Military activities like engagement, cyber, MISO, public affairs, reconstruction, civil military operations, and integrated financial operations (using money as a weapon system) are extremely important to success, at times designated as lines of effort, and are often intrinsically tied with other “DImE” efforts.

We see operational headquarters using a “cradle to grave” mindset to develop and integrate lethal and nonlethal actions to achieve desired outcomes. They are thinking integration from the beginning; from design, through planning, to further refinement via a targeting-like process, including synchronization of designated actions (see figure), execution, and feedback through an effective assessment process.³

We have seen:

- Inclusion of lethal and nonlethal design and planning activities in the J35 and J5.
- Long range planning of nonlethal development and information-related activities.
- Consideration as to the use of nonlethal means (including cyber) as the primary option in many situations, including shaping and deterrent options.
- Use of a targeting-like methodology to guide detailed development of lethal fires and nonlethal activities such as civil military operations, key leader engagement, and MISO.
- Much better synchronization of lethal and nonlethal actions.
- Assessment to deepen understanding and enrich guidance and intent.

Design, Planning, and Targeting. Design, planning, and targeting constitute overarching integrating processes used to support decision making in HQ and are well suited to form the basis for integrating lethal and nonlethal actions. Design focuses on understanding the operational environment and the problem, and development of an operational approach that underpins subsequent planning. Planning focuses on solving the problem through development of detailed plans and concepts of operation. Targeting enables selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate lethal and nonlethal response to them. We find commander’s guidance and intent, as developed in design and planning, largely drives targeting. The



² This topic is further addressed in other DTD focus papers, specifically “Design and Planning,” “Assessment,” and “Interorganizational Coordination.” See URL on inside of front cover to access these papers.

³ We informally address design, planning, targeting, execution, and assessment as processes/efforts for ease in reading. Additionally, we also interchangeably use targeting terms such as cycle and methodology.

commander provides guidance on his objectives, priorities, and what effects fires should have on the enemy (e.g., deny, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, destroy, or influence).

We have seen a move by several operational headquarters to use a targeting-like methodology to help determine and guide the planning and development of lethal and nonlethal activities. They have found that the targeting cycle, whether it is the joint targeting cycle, the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A), Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD), or even the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop, facilitates selecting and prioritizing a broad range of “targets” and matching the appropriate lethal and nonlethal actions to them.

Some examples of these actions are:

- Lethal actions: Force employment actions, such as offensive operations, raids, and clearing operations; fires such as artillery, mortars, air, and naval fire.
- Nonlethal actions: Force employment actions, such as presence, deception, ruses, and demonstrations; and electronic warfare, computer network attack, area denial, and disruption operations.
- Some commands include the following as part of nonlethal fires; others identify them, as we do in this focus paper, as “nonlethal activities or actions:” engagement, military information support to operations, civil military operations, emergency services, and reconstruction.

As noted in the above definition box, joint doctrine defines targeting as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets [(i.e., entity, object, capability, function, individual or behavior considered for possible engagement or other action)] and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.”⁴ Fires is defined as “the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.”⁵ The nature of the target or threat, the METT-TC conditions, and desired outcomes determine whether actions need to be lethal or nonlethal.

We have seen that the focus of targeting is further affected by the type of operational environment. The “Targeting Scope” figure on the next page depicts how we may be more lethally focused in traditional conflict, and more balanced or even nonlethally focused in irregular warfare. In this latter case, the terms “fires” and “weapons systems” are interpreted more liberally, encompassing a multitude of actions including KLE and MISO. We find that

Joint Targeting – Terminology

Target: An entity (person, place, or thing) considered for possible engagement or action to alter or neutralize the function it performs for the adversary.

Targeting: The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.

Joint Targeting: Joint targeting is a fundamental task of the fires function that encompasses many disciplines and requires participation from all joint force staff elements and components, along with various nonmilitary agencies. The primary purpose of joint targeting is to integrate and synchronize all weapon systems and capabilities.

Joint Targeting Cycle: is designed to create effects in a systematic manner. It is a rational and iterative process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets systematically.

Maneuver: Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.

Fires: The use of weapons systems to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target.


– Joint Pub 1-02 and Joint Pub 3-60

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington, DC: 8 November 2010), p 287.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Fires Support*, JP 3-09, (Washington, DC: 30 June 2010), p vii.

many of the nonlethal activities noted in the irregular warfare box of the figure are developed using a targeting-like methodology in staff sections/B2C2WGs across the staff (not just in the J3 Joint Fires Element).

The force is continuing to expand its interpretation (and potential definition) of the terms “target” and “targeting” to address the much greater nonlethal aspect of informing and influencing people. Inherent within this expansion is a focus on informing and influencing numerous friendly and neutral audiences which may include local host nation leaders and population. These individuals or groups could be “nominated target audiences” within a more expanded, nonlethal inform and influence engagement viewpoint. We have even seen development of two types of target lists: one more traditional and lethally focused, the other more shaping and influence focused.




A traditional lethal-focused perspective of the terms target and targeting may result in a perspective that the above “friendly and neutral audiences” are not “lawful targets” under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and outside the bounds of approved Rules of Engagement (ROE). This “lethal-focused” perception of targets and targeting is long-standing and difficult to overcome with other agencies, stakeholders, and coalition partners.⁶

We have found that commanders and their staffs realize this dilemma, and opt to either more clearly define what they mean by a “target” as including inform and/or influence targets, or classify these friendly and neutral audiences differently as audiences – but not “target audiences” to avoid any lethal-focused perception while still using a targeting-like methodology to determine how to best inform and/or influence them. In either event, as nonlethal inform and influence engagements expand within the traditional targeting-like methodologies, the means by which those engagements are conducted must be reviewed to ensure the commander does not employ improper methods for specific audiences and effects. The review of these nonlethal engagements is similar to lethal targeting reviews under LOAC and ROE, but may include different domestic and international laws applicable to nonlethal engagements. This may ultimately require the commander to take a broader approach, opting to request assistance from other U.S. government agencies, in order to carry out some nonlethal engagements.

Targeting Processes. Commanders and their planners in the J35 and J5 are central to effective early-on integration of lethal and nonlethal actions through guidance and operational framework planning actions. We have seen effective integration of targeting-like processes supporting planning in many of the operational headquarters to integrate both lethal fires and other nonlethal actions.

⁶ See Authorities focus paper dated July 2013. See URL on inside of front cover to access this paper.



The commander's decision cycle and the targeting cycle/processes (see figure) are fully integrated and inform each other. The iterative steps of the targeting cycle (whether it is a joint, land, or other doctrinal targeting or planning cycle) supports operational planning and execution with a comprehensive, iterative, and logical methodology for employing joint targeting to support achievement of objectives. We find that staffs in many HQ use attributes of both the planning process and targeting cycle to plan and coordinate various nonlethal actions

such as engagement, MISO, reconstruction, and reintegration.

We also find that the decision cycle and joint targeting cycle are effectively postured to guide subordinate service-unique targeting cycles and mission partner processes depicted in the earlier figure.⁷ The joint targeting process allows component commanders to plan, coordinate, and employ organic fires and fire support in their areas of operation (AOs) nested within the joint force HQ concept.

Insights:

- Operational HQ view lethal and nonlethal actions much more holistically than a solely lethal “fires” view. They recognize the need to integrate all actions - including maneuver, civil-military, inform and influence activities, and other “DIME” actions in addition to traditional “lethal fires” actions.
- The nature of the audience, target, or threat, the METT-TC conditions, and desired outcomes determine whether actions need to be lethal and/or nonlethal.
- Integrate lethal and nonlethal actions up front as an integral part of the overall planning process supporting the future plans and future operations event horizons.
- Use a targeting-like methodology to develop and plan specific nonlethal actions (e.g., KLE) much like one develops and plans lethal fires.
- Be sensitive to non-military stakeholders’ perspectives opposing excessive expansion of the terms “target” and “targeting” due to these terms’ more well-known and traditional “lethal-oriented” connotations.
- Ensure that the assessment process sufficiently captures both the lethal and nonlethal effects to deepen understanding and inform subsequent guidance and intent.

⁷ Note the generic nature of the stakeholder process in the figure. This simply denotes the many potential processes of stakeholders.


3.0 SYNCHRONIZATION OF STAFF EFFORTS.

Staff Organization. Organizing the staff to integrate lethal and nonlethal activities is a key task for all operational level HQ. As noted earlier, the situation will tend to drive the degree and balance of lethal and nonlethal planning and execution, which in turn can affect the organizational structure of the HQ. This section addresses several options regarding JTF staff organization initiatives to assist in integrating lethal and nonlethal planning and execution. The subsequent section takes this discussion one step further in addressing critical B2C2WGs and their logical arrangement in integrating lethal and nonlethal actions.


Most J3 staffs normally have a current operations section (J33/JOC), future operations section (J35), Joint Fires Element (JFE), J39 Information Operations (IO) element, and other sections to include a Civil-Military Operations (CMO) section if not established under the J5, J9, or other staff section.

We have seen several staff organizational options (see figures on the right):

- Keep the JFE and J39 IO sections separate but with increased crosstalk.
- Combine in what many term an “Effects Coordination Center” (ECC) to oversee and integrate lethal targeting and information-related nonlethal actions.⁸
- Establish an “Inform and Influence” or “Communication Actions” staff element to focus on planning and executing nonlethal “communication” activities.⁹



We see an ECC, when established, under the J3. The ECC, when established, typically includes at a minimum the JFE and J39 cell. Furthermore the JFE or ECC needs an integration planning capability to interact (i.e., to formulate the Commander’s targeting guidance) with other planners and staff within the HQ to accomplish integration of lethal and nonlethal actions up front in the design and planning process rather than “adding on” nonlethal actions at the end. Some ECCs also include the HQ assessment cell, realizing that the assessment cell coordinates staff-wide



⁸ Many question the title “ECC” arguing that it does not coordinate effects, but rather coordinates actions to achieve desired effects. We agree, but use the term ECC here due to its use in the field.

⁹ The term communication refers to inform and influence type of activities, not the more well-known J6 “command, control, and communication” activities.

efforts, not solely the ECC. Most ECCs do not include the engineering and CMO staffs, recognizing that their inclusion may broaden the staff focus too much and reduce ability for detailed planning and oversight. Several HQ continue to separate both physically and process-wise the Public Affairs staff to maintain appropriate separation of focus and purpose while retaining a PA planner/representative to ensure shared situational awareness and crosstalk.

Several ECCs have experienced “mission creep,” (e.g., being given more tasks in the nonlethal realm such as CMO and development). These ECCs have noted a decline in quality and fidelity of both lethal and inform and influence-related planning and execution when given these additional tasks.

We have also seen a trend (based on the situation) to separate out the inform and influence-related (communication and engagement-related) activities from the J3 section, establishing an “Inform and Influence Center (I&I CTR)” (or Communication Actions Center) to increase focus on these activities in more nonlethal-oriented mission sets. We have seen successful incorporation of elements of PA and J39 staffs within this directorate, each operating in accordance with its prescribed roles and functions – all in support of the commander’s (and center director’s) direction. Every command we observe clearly specifies the PA “inform” role in providing facts and directly responding to the commander. They all guard this role and keep a clear divide between the PA section and any operational influence activities. This organization and description is further addressed in the “Inform and Influence” focus paper at the URL noted on the inside front cover.

Insights:


- Continue J3 lead (with J5 for future planning requirements) in integration efforts across design, planning, targeting, and execution.
- Retain a separate JFE and J39 IO cell under the J3 for most situations to preclude layering and duplication of effort.
- The JFE can be overwhelmed and the lethal targeting and fires function can be diluted if given staff responsibility for planning and integrating all nonlethal actions (e.g., reconstruction, engagement, reconciliation, etc.).
- Consider establishment of an ECC under the J3 to more closely align lethal targeting and nonlethal inform and influence-related capabilities when operating in a balanced lethal and nonlethal environment.
- A separate Communication Actions/Inform and Influence staff element may be of value in a more population-centric mission such as COIN, stability operations, or disaster relief. In this case, this directorate may include both an IO and PA section, while emphasizing the “inform” role of PA and its direct access to the commander. We often see the lethal-oriented JFE and supporting IO elements (primarily cyber) remaining in the J3. The Communication Actions/Inform and Influence staff element must remain closely tied to the J3 and J5 to maintain full alignment with operations.
- Recommend retaining CMO type staff functions under another staff element such as the J9, recognizing J3 overall lead, and mandating strong crosstalk requirements with related B2C2WGs.

Central Role of Planning for Integration. As noted, we have observed as a best practice that commanders and their planners lead the integration of lethal and nonlethal actions up front in the design and planning process rather than “adding on” nonlethal actions at the end. We find that

clear understanding of the problem, planning guidance, commander’s intent, and the operational framework provide the necessary up front direction for the coherent integration of lethal and nonlethal actions at the operational level while appropriately leaving synchronization of detailed execution to subordinate tactical units.

The adjacent figure depicts the lead role of the Operational Planning Teams (OPT) in informing and being informed by the functional working groups and J-code staff elements in integrating lethal and nonlethal actions. These OPTs ensure planning both drives and leverages targeting and other planning efforts across the staff.

Lethal and nonlethal planning and synchronization is a staff-wide effort. The working groups (WG) and J-codes staffs noted above have an important role in the planning and integration of lethal and nonlethal actions. Not all are located in the J3, Joint Fires Element, ECC, or I&I Center. Attempts to subordinate all nonlethal planning efforts solely under the J3 can cause task saturation and reduced effectiveness.




We find that the working groups involved in this integration of actions are interdependent. Lethal and nonlethal actions complement each other; therefore the planning of lethal and nonlethal actions is inseparable. Crosstalk between the planning efforts within the many B2C2WGs is important; so is the need for a synchronization process and venue to occur before the numerous efforts are presented to the commander. At times, all of these efforts may be synchronized at the individual OPT level; however, we have also seen that, due to the complexity, sensitivity, and scope of these actions, synchronization of these actions may also occur in the form of “steering group” venues in which deputy commanders, the CoS, and staff principals ensure synchronization prior to presentation to the commander. Possible venues for these steering groups include the Joint Targeting Steering Group, Communication Strategy Steering Group, and Activities Steering Group (discussed later).

We have seen a requirement for some degree of synchronization for designated actions at the operational level to ensure those selected actions avoid any form of “effects” fratricide. However, we have found that the operational level headquarters cannot synchronize every lethal and nonlethal action. First, such detailed synchronization is contrary to the reasoning behind mission command and mission-type orders - any attempt to fully synchronize every individual action would slow and even possibly paralyze subordinate agility. Second, it is impossible to perform this degree of synchronization; these lethal and nonlethal actions are occurring throughout the battlespace. Detailed synchronization cannot keep up with the totality of actions occurring in the battlespace.

Insights (see figure on next page):

- Integrate lethal and nonlethal actions from the very beginning.

- Provide sufficient understanding up front to the commander via numerous venues to enable comprehensive guidance on both lethal and nonlethal actions.
- Enforce crosstalk between the OPTs and among the various lethal and nonlethal B2C2WGs to improve common understanding and staff synchronization.
- Incorporate steering groups as necessary to ensure integration of the many complex activities and synchronization of staff efforts prior to commander decision boards. However, guard against overengineering this synchronization with too many forums.
- The different lethal and nonlethal planning and targeting efforts often proceed at different frequencies, some weekly, others biweekly, or even monthly.
- More than one decision board may be required due to the scope of activities and different planning and targeting cycle frequency/speeds.



Relevant Processes and Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups

(B2C2WGs).¹⁰ We have seen HQ organize their battle rhythms following overall “critical paths” for logically grouped actions such as lethal fires, information actions, and stability actions (see figure). This construct, coupled with the directed crosstalk and cross representation noted on the figure, helps mitigate the

inclination to develop more and more battle rhythm events to synchronize staff actions. We find many Chiefs of Staff are limiting staff tendencies to add battle rhythm events, preferring to incorporate activities that integrate/synchronize in the agendas of “critical path” events.¹¹

Each of these critical paths has the necessary working groups and steering groups to develop necessary staff recommendations. There may also be a synchronizing decision board (e.g., Joint Synchronization Board (JSB)) that approves near term synchronization of lethal and nonlethal actions. Some more common critical paths (and key B2C2WGs) are:

- Lethal Actions critical path: Focused on lethal targeting culminating in a decision board. Uses a Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG) that enables selecting and prioritizing targets and

<p>JTWG: Joint Targeting Working Group Purpose: Purpose: Lethal targeting focus for target system analysis in support of future ops/plans OPTs and resourcing and synchronization of deliberate /dynamic targets within current ops</p>	<p>JTCB: Joint Targeting Coordination Board Purpose: Normally facilitates and coordinates joint force targeting activities with components schemes of maneuver to ensure JFC priorities are met. Often lethal oriented.</p>
<p>CSWG: Communication Strategy Working Group Purpose: Nonlethal targeting focus for target system analysis in support of future ops/plans OPTs and the resourcing and synchronization of deliberate/dynamic targets within current ops</p>	<p>JSB: Joint Synchronization Board Purpose: Approve near term synchronization of lethal and nonlethal actions</p>

¹⁰ One of many acronyms for staff integration elements – Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups.


¹¹ More discussion on processes and B2C2WGs is in the *Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm* focus paper. See URL on inside front cover.

matching the appropriate lethal and supporting nonlethal response(s) to them, and a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCCB) that provides recommendations for decision. There may also be associated nonlethal working groups that support lethal targeting.

- Inform and Influence Activities critical path: Several working groups such as some form of overarching Communication Strategy (I&I focused) Working Group (CSWG)¹² that develops an overarching communication strategy nested with the operational concept; a Key Leader Engagement (KLE) working group that uses a targeting-like methodology to identify engagement “targets;” an Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) that aligns military information support to operations (MISO), military deception, and cyber activities; and a public affairs element that proactively plans to inform media audiences in support of the commander’s objectives. There may also be associated finance working groups that target financial linkages and sources. There may be a few steering or decision meetings, for example, a communication strategy decision board, an IO decision board, and KLE steering group based on the detailed decisions necessary in the “communication/information” human-oriented cognitive domain.
- Stability Activities critical path: Selected governance and development working groups that identify, assess, and resource requirements in support of the operational concept. Some B2C2WGs are Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) working groups, approval boards, and interagency coordination groups aligning military and other key stakeholders’ planned actions.

Insights:

- Use some form of synchronizing process to integrate designated lethal and nonlethal actions to prevent parallel, unaligned actions and effects. Without a concerted effort or venue to ensure all lethal and all nonlethal efforts are synchronized, a staff risks “effects fratricide.”
- Based on the complexity and need for additional



oversight, consider CoS or Deputy Commander-led steering groups for refinement prior to a commander hosted decision board. Otherwise, the commander may receive multiple target lists/actions which, though individually commendable, are not fully nested together within a comprehensive targeting strategy. Recognize additional associated workloads with these steering groups.

¹² We’ve seen many different naming conventions for the staff integrating element focused on aligning and nesting words and messages. Some call it a communication strategy working group, others call it a communication synchronization working group, while others refer to it as an inform and influence working group. Some even make it a permanent cell or center rather than only a working group due to its full time importance.

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Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AO – Area of Operations	J35 – Future Operations Cell of a Joint Staff
B2C2WG – Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups	J39 – Global Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
CERP – Commander’s Emergency Response Program	J5 – Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of a Joint Staff
CMO – Civil Military Operations	J9 – Civil-Military Operations Staff Section
COIN – Counterinsurgency	JCW – Joint and Coalition Warfighting
CoS – Chief of Staff	JFE – Joint Fires Element
CSWG – Communication Strategy Working Group	JOC – Joint Operations Center
D3A – Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess	JP – Joint Publication
DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic	JSB – Joint Synchronization Board
DTD – Deployable Training Division	JTCB – Joint Targeting Coordination Board
ECC – Effects Coordination Center	JTWG – Joint Targeting Working Group
F3EAD – Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate	KLE – Key Leader Engagement
HUMINT – Human Intelligence	LOAC – Law of Armed Conflict
HQ – Headquarters	METT-TC – Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops Available, Time, and Civil considerations
I&I CTR – Inform and Influence Center	MISO – Military Information Support to Operations
IMNT – Imagery Intelligence	OODA – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
IO – Information Operations	OPT – Operational Planning Team
IOWG – Information Operations Working Group	PA – Public Affairs
J3 – Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff	ROE – Rules of Engagement
J33 – Joint Staff Current Operations Officer	SIGINT – Signals Intelligence

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